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Abstract
We present a dynamic model in which an employee of a firm searches for business projects
in a changing environment. It is costly to induce the employee who found a successful project
in the past period to search for a new project. Past success can therefore result in profit-
reducing corporate inertia. Still, when the firm chooses to counteract the reluctance to search
by increasing the power of the incentives, it stimulates initial search eﬀorts and results in
higher profits. Corporate restructuring and increasing the employee’s authority over time
are means to alleviate inertia but may undermine initial search incentives.
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1 Introduction
Innovation is a main source of competitive advantage and a key determinant of survival in
many industries. Innovation may, however, require costly adjustments within the organization,
and it may therefore be diﬃcult to motivate employees to embrace change and actively pursue
innovation (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Henderson 1993). Empirical evidence suggests that
successful firms are particularly prone to maintaining the status quo for too long, and that they
thereby miss out on new business opportunities; see Chesbrough, 2003, and the references cited
therein.
In this paper we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model to analyze the tension between
success and innovation. In the first period a firm hires an employee to search for and implement
an innovation, that we will call a “project.” If the employee does not find a profitable project, she
will search again for a project in the second period. The situation is diﬀerent if the employee finds
a successful project in the first period. Then, if there is a non-negligible probability that the first-
period project will continue to be successful, she will be reluctant to invest eﬀort in searching for
a new project. Thus, success represents an obstacle to innovation caused by moral hazard. This
is consistent with the argument in the organization literature that past investments in current
competencies prevent firms from adopting competence-destroying innovations (Leonard-Barton,
1992; Levinthal and March, 1993; Tushman and Anderson, 1986).
An example of the type of problem that we address in this paper is provided by Tripsas and
Gavetti (2000), who give a detailed account of Polaroid’s diﬃculties in the transition from analog
to digital imaging. By the 1970s Polaroid had developed a very profitable instant photography
business centered on three core ideas: i) long-term and large-scale R&D projects, ii) the value of
paper prints and high picture quality, and iii) third-degree price discrimination, where cameras
were sold cheaply and complementary prints were expensive. This business model turned out to
be ill-suited for the digital imaging business, which is characterized by rapid innovation cycles,
profit margins on cameras rather than prints, and consumers who place limited value on the
superior quality and tangible nature of a conventional photo. While the management at Polaroid
invested heavily in digital technology, they refused to change the underlying business model based
on the three core ideas. This led to a near-failure of the company’s digital imaging business, and
it took until 1998 for Polaroid to radically change its strategy. Apparently, the change came too
late: on October 11, 2001, Polaroid Corporation filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and
almost all of the company’s assets were sold oﬀ. It is, of course, unclear whether Polaroid would
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have ever been able to successfully make the transition to digital imaging, but the management’s
reluctance to give up the existing business model and search for one better suited to the new
environment certainly added to Polaroid’s diﬃculties.
While the causes of inertial tendencies in successful firms have been studied extensively, there
is very little work on the role of economic incentives in facilitating change. Indeed, Kaplan
and Henderson (2005) argue that the organization literature and the economics literature on
incentives belong to diﬀerent domains and that bringing them together represents an important
challenge. We contribute to this line of research by identifying a mechanism that explains why
monetary incentives are ineﬀective in promoting change in successful firms. In the analysis we
adopt the assumption that the parties contract only on the project outcome, for example, because
the management does not observe the details of the project. Introducing a monetary bonus to
stimulate searching has the undesired eﬀect of also increasing the employee’s payoﬀ from not
searching because the first-period project may continue to be successful. We show that this
increases the informational rents that the firm has to pay to the employee to induce searching.
Note that this problem is particularly pronounced in successful firms because their first period
projects are more likely to also be profitable in the second period than those of unsuccessful
firms. This provides a rather diﬀerent view of the problem of using monetary incentives to
mediate change than the perspective adopted by Kaplan and Henderson (2005) who argue that
the changes in the environment that elicit the need to transform the organization also make it
diﬃcult for management to design eﬃcient incentive schemes.
The increased cost of inducing search activities following first-period success can trigger one
of two diﬀerent reactions from the firm: either it will increase performance-based salaries to
encourage the employee to conduct a search or it will refrain from oﬀering monetary-based
incentives. The former option creates a larger economic rent for the employee. Thus, the firm
frequently does not elicit search activities even when this means that the joint second-period
surplus will be lower than that reached in the case of first-period failure. We refer to this
excessive reliance on the first-period project as inertia. It is shown that the low salary level
associated with inertia reduces the employee’s first-period search eﬀorts and diminishes total
firm profits.
As a means of preventing inertia, we first discuss several forms of organizational change, such
as the restructuring of tasks, job rotation and intermittent employee replacement. For example,
job rotation in the second period forces all employees, including those who were successful in the
2
first period, to look for a profitable project in their new area of responsibility. We show that the
firm can benefit from job rotation in the second period but that the optimal policy is not always
time-consistent. Indeed, there are circumstances in which the optimal policy is not to rotate
jobs, even when doing so would boost second-period profits. Therefore, a firm risks changing
its organizational structure too often, thereby undermining employee incentives to search in the
first period.
In an extension of the model we analyze an alternative policy that counteracts inertial tendencies
by delegating part of the authority over project choice to the employee, a decision that increases
her private benefits from the project. For example, the employee may be given the opportunity
to learn a new technology, pursue a project in which she has intrinsic interest, or enjoy other
perks. The analysis shows that the delegation of authority takes on a diﬀerent role in each
period. In the second period, the firm delegates more authority to the employee to reduce
the cost of inducing search activity. However, as with job rotation, this may undermine the
employee’s incentives to search in the first period. This problem can be alleviated by delegating
a suﬃcient level of authority to the employee in the first period as to increase the second-period
wage in case of success. While this decreases second-period profits, it serves as an additional
reward for success for the employee which, in turn, increases the first-period search eﬀorts and
the firm’s total profits.
Our paper is related to several bodies of literature in both economics and management. Boyer
and Robert (2006) also consider a two-period principal-agent model. In the first period a project
is implemented, and in the second period an alternative project becomes available. If the
profitability of the alternative project is private information to either the agent or the principal,
making use of the information can result in additional rents to the agent.1 For that reason, the
principal may decide not to use the information and to continue the first-period project instead;
this outcome is defined as inertia. As in this paper, inertia arises as the result of the principal’s
attempt to reduce the agent’s informational rents. However, Boyer and Robert’s model cannot
capture why successful firms are particularly vulnerable to inertia. Furthermore, the authors do
not discuss organizational solutions to the problem of inertia.
Scholars in evolutionary economics have extensively investigated cognitive reasons for inertia
within organizations. Nelson and Winter (1982) and Dosi (1982), among others, have stressed
how scientists and engineers tend to myopically focus on existing technological trajectories and
1This can happen either because the principal has to commit to not exploiting the information or because the
agent has to be given incentives to reveal that information.
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paradigms, overlooking opportunities that may lie outside their search scope. While the latter
is undoubtedly an important motivating force behind organizational inertia, our model provides
a complementary explanation based on an agency problem.
The decision to adopt a major innovation has important redistribution eﬀects within the organi-
zation. The economics literature has argued that such decisions are liable to influence activities
by the involved parties (Meyer et al., 1992; Milgrom, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988). Such
eﬀorts divert resources from more productive uses, slow down the decision-making process, and
sometimes prevent organizational change altogether (Schaefer, 1998). Furthermore, the parties
negatively aﬀected by the introduction of the innovation may try to improve the existing tech-
nology to convince decision-makers to keep supporting it and to thereby maintain the status
quo (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1995; Fosfuri and Rønde, 2009). Again, because our model does
not build on intra-organizational conflict, we oﬀer an alternative explanation for inertia.
More generally, our analysis is related to the literatures on dynamic moral hazard and on del-
egation. In dynamic models of moral hazard, the incentives in a given period depend on past
outcomes during the employment relationship - for example, to provide inter-temporal insurance
to the agent (Rogerson, 1985), to take changes in the agent’s wealth into account (Fudenberg et
al., 1990), or to match outside oﬀers that reflect the available information regarding the agent’s
ability (Holmström, 1999); see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for an excellent exposition of this
literature. A key diﬀerence between this literature and our approach is that past success in our
model increases the agent’s payoﬀ from shirking even for fixed monetary incentives. Our paper
is also related to the literature on delegation and endogenous information acquisition in agency
relationships. Starting with the seminal contribution of Aghion and Tirole (1997), a number of
papers have studied how, for example, delegation of authority to the agent or of veto-rights to
the principal can ensure the dual purpose of eﬃcient ex-ante acquisition and ex-post use of infor-
mation (Szalay, 2005; Liu, 2005; Mylovanov, 2008). Here we abstract from problems related to
the eﬃcient ex-post use of information and focus solely on the role of delegation for information
acquisition. However, unlike in the aforementioned literature, we do this in a dynamic context.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model, defines inertia and explains
when it arises, and discusses ways to reduce it. Section 3 analyzes a dynamic policy of delegation,
and Section 4 oﬀers concluding remarks.
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2 A Model of Organizational Inertia
Consider a simple dynamic model of moral hazard where the agency problem in each period is
formulated as a search process similar to the one used in Aghion and Tirole (1997). In each of
two periods, t = 1, 2, a firm can pursue one of infinitely many ex-ante identical projects with a
duration of one period. The projects that we have in mind represent a significant innovation.
They are not limited to new products but also include improvements to the production process,
marketing, or distribution systems. In each period only one of the projects is of positive value.
This project is denoted by x∗t . All other projects yield non-positive values for the firm.
An employee is hired for two periods to acquire information in order to identify x∗t and to imple-
ment the project if a project is pursued. Unlike in Aghion and Tirole (1997), the management
of the firm is thus assumed to not be involved in the search process; e.g., because they do not
have the time or the ability required to do this. The employee’s information acquisition yields
a signal about x∗t , x˜t. The signal is correct with probability qt and incorrect with probability
1− qt. If the signal is incorrect, each of these projects with non-positive value is signalled with
equal probability. Because there are infinitely many projects, each of these projects is signalled
with probability zero, allowing us to abstract from learning from past failed projects. Acquiring
information is costly for the employee, and her private cost 12γq
2
t is increasing in the expected
quality of the signal. The owners of the firm observe the outcome of the project but neither the
exact nature of the project nor the search intensity qt.
After the project is selected, the employee observes whether the project is of positive value or
not. A project that is of non-positive value for the firm also is of non-positive value for the
employee. She has no interest in pursuing such a project and reveals the value of the project
truthfully. The project is then scaled down to a minimum (a switch to a diﬀerent project is
impossible at this stage), and the firm and the employee each receive a payoﬀ of zero. If the
project of positive value is selected, it is fully implemented. The value of a fully implemented
profitable project in period t is Bt > 0, t = 1, 2. A certain fraction of this value, (1−θ)Bt, cannot
be extracted by the firm but instead is privately appropriated by the employee. The employee’s
benefit can be monetary or non-monetary in nature. For example, if implementing and running
the project involves an additional moral hazard problem, (1 − θ)Bt could be an informational
rent that the firm pays to the employee in order to realize the gross value Bt. Alternatively, it
could be that the employee runs the project in the way that is best for her career rather than
doing what is in the best interest of the firm’s owners. We assume that the employee’s private
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benefit is not the largest portion of the project value, θ ∈ [0.5, 1].
The project that has positive value in period 1 may not be the positive value project in period
2. The optimal projects in the two periods are not identical with probability α ∈ [0, 1]. Hence,
α characterizes the volatility of the firm’s environment. We can think of it as the probability
of a change in consumer preferences or the technology frontier that requires a major redirection
of the firm’s activities. (We will refer to α as the ‘volatility’ of the firm’s environment or the
‘external pressure’ on a firm that has implemented a profitable project.) In other words, with
probability α there exists a project in period 2 that wipes out the rent from the eﬀort made
in the previous period. This specification captures the important economic eﬀect of significant
innovations in that they reduce the value of current competencies and require employees to
invest in building up new ones.
We assume that the firm and the employee are unable write a two-period incentive contract.
It is usually not possible to contract directly on the value created by an employee because
firm profits derive from many sources and result from team production. Instead, the firm and
the employee can contract on indicators of performance such as sales, market share or level of
customer satisfaction. This makes it diﬃcult to design a well-functioning incentive scheme in a
changing environment as the relevant performance indicators can change in a way that cannot
be foreseen ex ante.2 As a consequence, we focus here on a situation wherein the possibility of
writing short-term contracts are good whereas long-term incentive contracting is impossible.3
In particular, it is assumed that the firm at the beginning of each period oﬀers a contract to the
employee that specifies a salary supplement in the event of success. However, it is not possible to
contract on the exact nature of the project because this is private information to the employee
or not verifiable in court.
Finally, it is assumed that all players are risk-neutral and that the employee is wealth-constrained
in every period and has a reservation utility equal to zero. This implies in particular that any
first-period salary awarded to the employee is consumed before the start of the second period.
The following restriction on γ is imposed to exclude corner solutions in the employee’s choice of
qt:
2For example, the appropriate weights of the individual performance metrics that measure project success can
vary with diﬃcult-to-predict changes in the demand structure or input prices.
3Also, the longer the time period between an employee’s action and the determination of her performance, the
more business activities take place in the interim. This increases the opportunities for the firm to misrepresent
the employee’s performance and limits the eﬀectiveness of contracting.
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A.1. γ ≥ B1, B2.
2.1 The Second Period
2.1.1 Failure in the First Period
We now solve the game backwards starting with the second period. At the beginning of the
second period, there are two possible states of nature: the first period project was a success (s),
i.e. x∗1 was implemented, or the selected project was a failure (f). We denote the employee’s
optimal search intensity in the second period by qj2, where j ∈ {s, f} indicates the first period
outcome.
Suppose that the first-period project was a failure, so that the employee does not know x∗1.
When choosing how precise a signal to acquire, the employee solves:
max
q2
½
q2 ((1− θ)B2 + w2)−
1
2
γ (q2)2
¾
⇒ qf2 (w2) =
1
γ
((1− θ)B2 + w2) .
Because the parties contract period by period, the salary contract oﬀered maximizes second
period profits:
max
w2
½³
θB2 − wf2
´ 1
γ
³
(1− θ)B2 + wf2
´¾
⇒ wf2 =
1
2
(2θ − 1)B2 and qf2
³
wf2
´
=
B2
2γ
.
Except for the limiting case of θ = 1/2, the firm always specifies a strictly positive performance-
based salary supplement to increase the employee’s search intensity. The resulting eﬀort level is
independent of θ. The expected second-period profit of the firm and utility of the employee are,
respectively:
E(π2|f) = B
2
2
4γ
, (1)
E(U2|f) = B
2
2
8γ
. (2)
For future reference, let us define the salary that maximizes aggregate surplus (utility plus
profits):
max
w2
½
q2 (w2)B2 −
1
2
γ (q2 (w2))2
¾
⇒ bwf2 = θB2.
This salary solves the agency problem by turning the employee into the de facto owner of the
firm. The firm does not oﬀer this salary bonus in equilibrium, wf2 < bwf2 , because the employee
is unable to compensate the firm for the cash flow rights — e.g., in the form of a negative fixed
salary.
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2.1.2 Success in the First Period
Consider now the problem of an employee who was successful in the first period and knows x∗1.
The employee receives a signal ex2. This signal indicates the optimal project in the second period
with probability q2. If ex2 = x∗1, the employee knows that x∗1 is optimal in the second period.4
Instead, if ex2 6= x∗1, the employee has conflicting signals and follows the one of higher quality.
Therefore, she switches from project x∗1 to ex2 if and only if q2 ≥ (1− α), where (1− α) is the
probability that x∗1 remains the profitable project.
The firm decides whether to induce the employee to search for a new project or not. Suppose first
that the firm induces searching. Then, the employee’s utility when searching, 12γ (w2 + (1− θ)B2)
2,
has to be weakly higher than when not searching, (1− α) (w2 + (1− θ)B2). This implies that
the firm’s maximization problem is
max
w2
½
(θB2 − w2)
1
γ
(w2 + (1− θ)B2)
¾
s.t.
1
2γ
(w2 + (1− θ)B2)2 ≥ (1− α) (w2 + (1− θ)B2) , (3)
1
γ
(w2 + (1− θ)B2) ≥ (1− α) . (4)
The search constraint (3) ensures that the employee does find it optimal to search. Constraint
(4) implies that the employee chooses ex2 whenever ex2 6= x∗1. Multiplying both sides of (4)
by the positive value (w2 + (1− θ)B2) reveals that it is always less restrictive than the search
constraint (3) and is therefore not binding. Solving the problem yields:
ws2,A =
½
2γ(1− α)− (1− θ)B2 for (1− α) ≥ B24γ ,
1
2(2θ − 1)B2 otherwise.
qs2,A =
(
2(1− α) for (1− α) ≥ B24γ ,
1
2γB2 otherwise.
The search constraint is only binding if x∗1 is suﬃciently likely to be successful also in period
2, (1− α) ≥ B2/4γ. When the search constraint is binding, the firm increases the salary bonus
ws2,A above w
f
2 in order to generate searching. The expected profits and utility are:
E(π2,A|s) =
(
(B2 − 2γ(1− α))2(1− α) for (1− α) ≥ B24γ ,
B22
4γ otherwise.
E(U2,A|s) =
(
2γ(1− α)2 for (1− α) ≥ B24γ ,
B22
8γ otherwise.
4 If hx2 6= x∗1, the probability of receiving the signal x∗1 is zero because there is an infinite number of non-positive
value projects, that are all equally likely to be signalled. Therefore, we have that Pr(hx2 = x∗2|hx2 = x∗1) = 1.
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The alternative option for the firm is not to encourage searching and to set ws2,B = 0. Then, we
have:
qs2,B =
(
0 for (1− α) ≥ 12γ (1− θ)B2,
1
γB2(1− θ) otherwise.
When the probability that the successful first-period project continues to be profitable — i.e.
(1− α) — is low the employee’s private benefit suﬃces to induce search. Otherwise, the employee
does not engage in search. This implies:
E(π2,B|s) =
(
θB2(1− α) for (1− α) ≥ 12γ (1− θ)B2,
1
γ θB
2
2(1− θ) otherwise.
E(U2,B|s) =
(
(1− θ)B2(1− α) for (1− α) ≥ 12γ (1− θ)B2,
1
2γ (1− θ)2B22 otherwise.
The following lemma compares these two solutions from the perspective of the firm:
Lemma 1 The optimal wage in the second period following a success is:
ws2 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 for (1− α) ≥ (2− θ)B24γ ,
2γ(1− α)− (1− θ)B2 for (2− θ)B24γ > (1− α) ≥
B2
4γ ,
1
2(2θ − 1)B2 otherwise.
Proof. Follows directly from comparing E(π2,A|s) and E(π2,B|s).
In a very stable environment — i.e. (1− α) high — providing search incentives is too expensive
relative to its benefits, and the firm sets ws2 = 0. In an environment of some volatility, (1− α) ∈³
(2− θ) B24γ ,
B2
4γ
´
, the firm induces searching by just satisfying the employee’s search constraint.
Finally, in a highly volatile environment, (1− α) low, neither the firm nor the employee has
an interest in recycling the last period’s project in the hope of continued success. Therefore,
the search constraint is not binding, and both the performance-based salary and the employee’s
search intensity are identical to that in the case of first-period failure.
The second period profits and utility in case of success are:
E(π2|s) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1− α)θB2 for 1− α ≥ (2− θ)B24γ ,
2(B2 − 2γ(1− α))(1− α) for (2− θ)B24γ > 1− α ≥
B2
4γ ,
B22
4γ otherwise.
(5)
E(U2|s) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1− α)(1− θ)B2 for 1− α ≥ (2− θ)B24γ ,
2γ(1− α)2 for (2− θ)B24γ > 1− α ≥
B2
4γ ,
B22
8γ otherwise.
(6)
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Let us again derive the salary that maximizes the second-period surplus. It is straightforward
to show that it is optimal that the employee either searches with the same intensity as in the
case of failure or does not search at all. Comparing these two alternatives yields:
bws2 = ½ 0 for (1− α) ≥ B22γ ,θB2 otherwise.
2.2 The First Period
In the first period, the employee maximizes her expected two-period utility when choosing the
eﬀort:
max
q1
½
q1 (w1 +E(U2|s) + (1− θ)B1) + (1− q1)E (U2|f)− 1
2
γ (q1)2
¾
,
which implies that
q∗1(w1) =
1
γ
(w1 +∆E(U2) + (1− θ)B1),
where ∆E(U2) ≡ E(U2|s)−E(U2|f) is derived from equations (2) and (6).
The firm maximizes two-period profits, taking the employee’s eﬀort choice into account:
max
w1
{q∗1(w1)(θB1 +E(π2|s)−w1) + (1− q∗1(w1))E(π2|f)} ,
which yields
w∗1 =
1
2
((2θ − 1)B1 +∆E(π2)−∆E(U2)) ,
where ∆E(π2) ≡ E(π2|s) − E(π2|f) is derived from equations (1) and (5). Hence, q∗1 =
1
2γ (B1 +∆E(π2) +∆E(U2)).
Using q∗1, we obtain that the total expected profits, E (Π), are:
E (Π) =
1
4γ
(B1 +∆E(S2))2 +E(π2|f) where ∆E(S2) ≡ ∆E(π2) +∆E(U2). (7)
The firm’s total expected profits are a strictly increasing function in the aggregate period 2
surplus after a success in period 1. The reason for this result is that the firm is able to extract
all rents that accrue to the employee in period 2 following first-period success. More precisely,
if success results in a higher utility in period 2, the firm can reduce the period 1 salary without
diluting the employee’s incentive to search.
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2.3 Searching and Inertia
We are interested in identifying the ineﬃciencies that arise from first-period success, and we
characterize situations in which first period success reduces the aggregate surplus in the second
period. As described above, a lower second-period surplus is not only detrimental to welfare;
it also decreases the total expected profits of the firm. Thus, the owners of the firm and a
hypothetical social planner would share an interest in maximizing second-period surplus.
Proposition 1 Comparing the outcomes in the second period following first period success and
failure:
i) For (1− α) ≤ B24γ , bws2 = bwf2 > wf2 = ws2 and ∆E(S2) = 0.
ii) For B24γ < (1− α) ≤
(2−θ)B2
4γ , bws2 = bwf2 > ws2 > wf2 and ∆E(S2) ≥ 0.
iii) For (2−θ)B24γ < (1− α) <
3B2
8γ , bws2 = bwf2 > wf2 > ws2 and ∆E(S2) < 0.
iv) Otherwise, bws2 ≥ ws2, bwf2 > wf2 , and ∆E(S2) ≥ 0.
Hence, for any θ > 1/2 there exists a non-empty set of values for α such that the second-period
surplus is smaller after first-period success. Any such loss in surplus results from the absence of
search eﬀort by the employee in the second period and therefore from excessive reliance on the
project implemented in period one.
Proof. Comparing the expressions for bws2, bwf2 , wf2 and ws2 yields the result regarding the
relative sizes of those variables. The sign of ∆E(S2) follows from comparing E(π2|s) +E(U2|s)
to E(U2|f)+E(π2|f). Following first-period success, searching is induced for parameter regimes
i) and ii), see Lemma 1 and the expression for qs2,B, whereas following first period-failure, the
employee searches for any α. Thus, the negative value of ∆E(S2) in regime iii) is a consequence
of the lack of searching following success.
Because a reduced second period surplus following success is caused by a lack of searching and
the excessive reliance on the first-period project, we refer to these circumstances as ‘inertia’.
The source of inertia is a commitment problem on the part of the firm. While the firm would
like to commit to maximizing the aggregate second-period surplus, it considers only second-
period profits when choosing the second-period salary, ws2. The problem for the firm is that if it
introduces a positive bonus ws2 to induce searching, the alternative of not searching also becomes
more attractive to the employee; see equation (3). This, in turn, implies that the firm cannot
induce searching without increasing the employee’s informational rents. These rents represent
a cost of searching in terms of second-period profits, but not in terms of second-period surplus
and, accordingly, total profits. In a relatively stable environment, this cost is suﬃciently large
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that the firm chooses not to induce searching.
In a more volatile environment, case ii) in Proposition 1, the search constraint is still binding,
but the firm chooses to induce searching. Here, unlike the previous case, first period success
increases second period surplus and profits. Due to the search constraint binding, it holds
ws2 > w
f
2 . Hence w
s
2 is closer to the salary bonus that maximizes second-period surplus than
wf2 , which results in ∆E(S2) > 0.
5 Here, the employee’s reluctance to search for a new project
benefits the firm by alleviating the firm’s commitment problem.
Finally, in a very volatile environment, case i) in Proposition 1, period 1 success does not
influence second-period search, and ∆E(S2) = 0. By contrast, in case iv) where the environment
is very stable, the firm optimally chooses not to induce search to save on search costs. Here, a
successful period 1 project represents valuable information to the firm, and ∆E(S2) > 0.
2.3.1 Industry Evolution
Problems of inertia are often associated with established firms that are operating in stagnating or
declining markets or market segments (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Sull, 1999). Let us therefore
briefly discuss how our model can be interpreted in the context of industry evolution. The
industry life cycle is typically characterized by rapid technological progress and growing market
size initially, followed by a slowdown in the innovation rate and stagnating or declining market
size (Abernathy and Utterback, 1975; Klepper, 1996).
To capture these life cycle characteristics, consider an industry where the value of a successful
project is Bt and the rate of innovation is αt. An innovation is as above an event that makes
the previous period’s successful project obsolete. Here, t is the period and t ∈ {1, ...,∞}. We
assume that αt < αt−1 and Bt+1 − Bt ≥ 0 for t ≤ t and Bt+1 − Bt < 0 for t > t for some
finite t. The firm exists forever and hires employees that live for two periods. In every period
the firm has a young employee in period 1 of her working life and an old employee in period 2
who work independently of each other. Thus, in each period t, the firm faces a situation when
hiring a young employee who may be reluctant to search in t+1 as described by our model with
B1 = Bt, B2 = Bt+1, and α = αt+1.
Suppose that innovation is initially suﬃciently rapid to avoid any inertial tendencies but ceases
eventually: 1− α1 ≤ B14γ and 1− αt >
3Bt
8γ for all t greater than some finite et. From Proposition
5Note that the firm never goes as far as to pay a bonus that exceeds ews2. The equilibrium salary bonus ws2 is
bounded from above by 1
2
θB2.
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1 follows that a successful old employee will search in period 2 at the beginning of the firm’s
existence but not late in its life. (The young workers always search because they cannot rely on
previous projects). As long as αt and Bt evolve in a smooth fashion, the firm will go through
three transitory phases between t = 1 and t = et: first a phase of constant incentives and
searching. Then, there is a phase of higher-powered incentives that increase over time to induce
searching followed by a phase of inertia.
The emergence of inertia depends not only on the rate of innovation but also on developments
in market size. To see this, consider two industries, A and B, that have the same rate of
innovation, {αt}∞t=1. The market size of industry A at date t is Bt whereas the market size
of industry B is γt−1Bt, γ > 1. Because the market size of industry B is larger than that of
industry A, it follows immediately from Proposition 1 that it takes longer for a firm in industry
B to experience diﬃculty motivating a successful employee to search for new opportunities. A
higher rate of innovation would have a similar eﬀect for a given evolution of market size, {Bt}∞t=1.
Dynamic industries with a high rate of innovation and fast market growth are in this sense less
prone to inertia than are less dynamic industries. The example is mainly suggestive, and a more
satisfactory model would include more firms and would link αt and Bt through explicit R&D
decisions. Regardless, the implications of our model appear to be in line with common findings
in the literature.
2.3.2 Reducing Inertia: Restructuring
The analysis shows that the eﬀect of past success depends crucially on whether the employee’s
reluctance to searching results in higher or lower powered incentives compared to the case of
period 1 failure. Here, we will discuss some examples of real life policies that can be used to
prevent inertia and identify the challenges of implementing them eﬀectively.
Because insuﬃcient external pressure may result in inertia, it is natural to complement it with
pressure from within the firm. One means of providing such pressure is to reorganize the firm
in the second period in a way that includes a change in individual tasks and responsibilities.
Reorganization forces the employees to find a way to accomplish their new tasks eﬃciently and
to invest in acquiring information in the second period. In our framework, a reorganization can
thus be understood as an activity that renders the probability that a project can be reemployed
in the second period equal to zero. Hence, for the employee it is as if α = 1.6
6We assume that a reorganization does not introduce any costs or benefits except those arising endogenously
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Alternatively, instead of reorganizing tasks, the firm can maintain a constant assignment of
tasks to positions, but rotate employees between positions. Yet another possibility is to hire
new employees every period. While these instruments place their focus on personnel rather
than task rearrangements, they also place employees in situations in which they cannot rely on
their past experience. Therefore, if one abstracts from transaction costs, they have identical
implications to a reorganization.7 In the following, we use the term ‘restructuring’ to refer to
all three instruments.
Restructuring is optimally applied only if there is inertia, that is if and only if ∆E(S2) < 0.
However, due to the lack of commitment, it is not necessarily applied in a time-consistent
manner: the firm has an incentive to restructure in the second period whenever ∆E(π2) < 0.
This time-consistency problem arises because the decision to restructure ignores any eﬀects that
the anticipated restructuring decision has on the employee’s first period eﬀort.8 The following
proposition identifies the ineﬃciencies that are eliminated and introduced when a restructuring
instrument is available.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the firm uses a policy of inducing searching by restructuring if and
only if ∆E(π2) < 0⇔ (1− α) ∈
³
B2
4γ ,
B2
4γθ
´
. Then, this has the following eﬀects on total profits:
i) The policy increases total profits for (1− α) ∈
³
(2−θ)B2
4γ ,min
³
3B2
8γ ,
B2
4γθ
´´
.
ii) The policy reduces total profits for (1 − α) ∈
³
B2
4γ ,
(2−θ)B2
4γ
´
as well as for (θ, 1 − α) ∈¡
1
2 ,
2
3
¢× ³3B28γ , B24γθ´.
Restructuring is an eﬀective way to avoid inertia. There are, however, parameters for which
the instrument is applied ineﬃciently by the firm. This happens when a restructuring increases
the firm’s second-period profit but at the cost of reducing total surplus. The firm’s gain from
due to the information being destroyed or created. The introduction of an explicit cost does not provide any
additional insights because it reduces the incentives to reorganize in a straightforward manner.
7Job rotation is commonly viewed as a policy intended to facilitate employee learning (Campion et al., 1994).
Our analysis is consistent with this explanation but stresses that job rotation not only provides new possibilities
for employees to learn but also increases the need for it.
8The tension between the firm’s ex-post eﬃcient decisions and employee’s ex-ante incentives to invest in the
employment relationship appears in many diﬀerent forms in the literature on dynamic incentives and organiza-
tional economics. For example, Gertner et al. (1994) explain why it may be optimal for multi-project firms
not to reallocate funds to the most profitable project in order to increase the employees’ initial investments in
entrepreneurial activities; Cremer (1995) shows that firms may choose not to observe an employee’s ability, at the
cost of ineﬃcient hiring decisions, in order to promote the employee’s initial eﬀorts to become successful; Carillo
and Gromb (2007) argue that firms may adopt a rigid corporate culture. Doing so increases the organization’s
cost of adapting to changes in the environment, to encourage the employees’ culture-specific investments.
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restructuring is less than the employee’s loss either because the environment is stable, and the
firm would pay a high but welfare enhancing wage supplement to induce search, or because the
employee derives a high expected private benefit from continuing the successful project. The
former (latter) possibility corresponds to the first (second) case in Proposition 2, part ii). The
problem for the firm is that an employee foreseeing a suboptimal policy of restructuring reacts
by lowering her first period eﬀort, reducing total firm profits.9
Because firms may also apply restructuring measures in cases when doing so reduces total firm
profits, firms may have an incentive to commit to not applying such measures. The firm may
try to secure commitment power by increasing the cost of restructuring. To make both reorga-
nization and job rotation more costly, a firm can, for example, choose an employment structure
that is dominated by specialists rather than generalists. Predominantly hiring specialists entails
higher costs of employee re-training when their tasks change.10 In the context of employment
duration, the firm may be able to commit to not replacing successful employees after the first
period by oﬀering severance pay. Another possibility is to include the continuation of employ-
ment directly as a part of the reward for success, a solution that resembles the academic system
of tenure. This explanation of tenure is in the spirit of McPherson and Winston (1983) who
argue that the tenure system protects the highly specific human capital investment made by
academics.
3 Dynamic Delegation
In this section we analyze a dynamic policy that prevents inertial tendencies by delegating more
authority over the project choice to the employee. For example, the employee might be given the
opportunity to learn a new technology, to pursue a project in which she has intrinsic interest, or
to enjoy other perquisites. We argue that this instrument can be superior to a monetary bonus,
because the reward is conditional on searching. For example, the employee only learns a new
technology if she undertakes a new project that uses it.
To formalize these notions, consider the following variation of the model: in period t a successful
project pays θtBt to the firm as profits and (1 − θt)Bt to the employee in the form of private
9This can be seen in the following way: A suboptimal restructuring policy changes ∆E(S2) > 0 to ∆E(S2) = 0.
It follows then immediately from q∗1 and E (Π)that the first period eﬀort and total profits are reduced.
10Some evidence in support of this notion is found by Eriksson and Ortega (2006) who show that the use of job
rotation is negatively correlated with the heterogeneity of the firm’s workforce.
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benefits. We assume without loss of insight that the value of the market is constant, B1 = B2 =
B. At the beginning of each period the firm is able to choose the period’s θt. We interpret
θt as the degree of authority over project choice that is delegated to the employee in period t,
θt ∈ [θ, θ]. An employee who enjoys more authority is able to implement a project in the way
that suits her interests better.11 Note that the degree of authority does not aﬀect the total
surplus that a project generates, only its distribution.
We restrict the firm’s delegation choices by assuming the following:
A.2. 1− (1−θ)
2B
2γ(1−α) > θ >
1
2 + θ −
B
8γ(1−α) .
Assumption A.2. implies that, through the use of delegation, the firm can make a successful
employee search at the wage wf2 (the second inequality) but not at the wage 0 (the first inequal-
ity). The assumption is not crucial for the results but reduces the number of cases that need to
be considered in the analysis.
In order to focus on circumstances where inertia is an issue, we assume:
A.3. (2−θ)B4γ < (1− α) <
3B
8γ .
Assumption A.3 and Proposition 1 imply together that the firm experiences inertia if θ1 = θ2 = θ
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Hence, if it is possible for the firm to prevent inertia, this is due to the policy
of delegation of authority that is used.
The rest of the model remains unchanged.
3.1 Second Period
As before we proceed backwards and start with the analysis of period 2. Suppose first that
the employee was unsuccessful in the first period. Then, the employee is oﬀered a bonus wf2 =
(2θ2 − 1)/2. This results in an eﬀort of B/2γ, which leads to the following expected payoﬀs:
E(π2|f) = B
2
4γ
,
E(U2|f) = B
2
8γ
.
The expected payoﬀs do not depend on the degree of authority, and any θ2 ∈ [θ, θ] is optimal.
11Our analysis does therefore not apply to delegation of authority over decisions regarding matters like working
hours or dress code that aﬀect the employee’s private benefits in the same way irrespective of the project chosen.
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If the firm experiences first-period success, the firm can either decide to continue the period 1
project or to induce searching. If it does not encourage searching, it oﬀers the wage ws2 = 0.
In the region considered, the employee then chooses not to search and to propose the period 1
project again. The resulting profits are (1 − α)θ1B. Instead, if the employee is encouraged to
search, the utility from searching for a new project must be greater than or equal to the utility
from not searching. The firm’s problem is therefore:
max
(w,θ2)
½
(θ2B − w2)
1
γ
(w2 + (1− θ2)B)
¾
s.t.
1
2γ
(w2 + (1− θ2)B)2 ≥ (1− α)(w2 + (1− θ1)B), (8)
θ2 ∈
£
θ, θ
¤
, (9)
where inequality (8) ensures searching. Note that this search constraint specifies that the em-
ployee’s utility in case of searching is a function of θ2 whereas her utility depends on θ1 when
she does not search. More authority over the project choice, corresponding to a lower value of
θ2, relaxes the search constraint (8), because it is more attractive for the employee to invest
eﬀorts in finding a new project.
The following lemma characterizes the solution to this problem.
Lemma 2 If the firm chooses to induce a successful employee to search in the second period,
θ2 = θ is an optimal level of authority. The wage oﬀered to the employee is:
ws2(θ1) =
(
(1− α)γ −B(1− θ) +
p
(1− α)γ((1− α)γ − 2B(θ1 − θ)) if (1− α) ≤ B4γ(1−2(θ1−θ))
(2θ−1)B
2 otherwise
.
Proof: In appendix. ¥
Suppose first that the firm can relax the search constraint (8) completely by choosing θ2 suﬃ-
ciently low. Any value of θ2 that achieves this, including θ2 = θ, is then optimal. The reason
is that the choice of θ2 does not aﬀect the total surplus generated by the project. So long as
the search constraint is not binding, it is thus of no consequence to the firm whether the reward
for success consists of private benefits or a monetary bonus. Instead, if the search constraint
binds in the solution, it is strictly optimal to let the employee enjoy as much authority as pos-
sible, θ2 = θ. This minimizes the wage ws2(θ1) that the firm has to oﬀer by relaxing the search
constraint.
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Using the delegation of authority to provide incentives has the advantage that the reward is
conditional on the employee searching. Increasing the employee’s authority in the second period
is thus a more eﬃcient way for the firm to relax the search constraint than oﬀering a larger
monetary bonus. Note also that the choice to allow the employee to pursue her favorite project
is not a cause of success as in Aghion and Tirole (1997). Indeed, in a one-period version of our
model profits would be independent of θ. Rather, the delegation of authority is a consequence
of success and serves to maintain the company’s success.
We are now ready study the firm’s decision whether to induce search or not in the second period.
Lemma 3 If θ < 23 and
(2−θ)B
4γ < (1− α) <

1+θ−
√
θ(2+θ)

B
4γ , there exists a non-empty set
(eθL,eθH) ⊂ ³θ, 12 + θ − B8γ(1−α)´ such that the firm induces a successful employee to search in the
second period if and only if θ1 ∈ (eθL,eθH).
Proof: In appendix. ¥
Figure 1 illustrates the expected profits as a function of θ1 both when the employee is induced to
search and when she is not. In the example illustrated, it is optimal to encourage the employee
to search for θ1 ∈ (eθL = 0.5716,eθH = 0.6748). There are several things to notice from the figure.
First, because we consider a region wherein inertia would arise in the base model, a successful
firm does not induce searching if θ1 = θ2 = θ. Hence, πS2 (θ) < (1−α)θB in the figure. Secondly,
the less autonomy the employee is granted in the first period, the more the search constraint can
be relaxed in the second period by choosing θ2 = θ and the lower is the wage ws2(θ1). However,
the marginal value of reducing ws2(θ1) is decreasing, which explains why π
S
2 (θ1) is increasing but
concave in θ1. Therefore, because the profits from maintaining a successful project are linearly
increasing in θ1, the firm induces searching for intermediate values of θ1.
An increase in the volatility of the environment increases the profits from searching because a
successful employee is less reluctant to search and reduces the profits from no searching. Hence,
an increase in α shifts (1−α)θ1B down and πS2 (θ1) up in Figure 1, expanding the set θ1 ∈ (eθL,eθH)
for which searching is encouraged. Similarly, a decrease in α reduces the set of θ1 for which the
firm encourages the employee to search, possibly to the point where search is unprofitable for
all θ1 ∈ [θ, θ].
Proposition 3 If the conditions in Lemma 3 are fulfilled and θ1 ∈ (eθL,eθH), the firm does not
suﬀer from inertia. Otherwise, inertia arises in the second period.
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Figure 1: The profit functions when search is induced (πS2 (θ1), indicated by the solid line) and
when it is not ((1 − α)θ1B, indicated by the dashed line) for B = 1, γ = 2, (1 − α) = 0.1819,
and θ = 0.55.
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Proof: In appendix. ¥
If the firm can ensure searching in the second period through the use of delegation, inertia will
not arise. The intuition is that the firm will use a combination of delegation and monetary
incentives to ensure that searching is profitable for both the firm and the employee. A successful
employee is oﬀered a higher reward for success than is an unsuccessful employee, which results
in a higher second-period surplus following success.
3.2 The First Period
The analysis of the firm’s decisions in period 2 shows that the allocation of authority in period
1 can serve as a commitment device. Consider again the example illustrated in Figure 1. Here,
the firm can commit either to inducing searching in period 2 by choosing θ1 ∈ (eθL,eθH) or to
preventing searching by choosing a value of θ1 that lies outside of this interval.
The first period choice of monetary bonus can be analyzed as in the base model. Inserting the
optimal first period bonus, the total two-period profits of the firm can be written as:
E (Π) =
1
4γ
(B +E(S2(θ1)|s)−E(S2|f))2 +E(π2|f), (10)
where E(S2(θ1)|s) and E(S2|f) are the social surplus in the second period given first-period
success and failure, respectively. Note that the choice of authority in the first period only aﬀects
social welfare in case of success. Also, θ2 has been suppressed in the notation because it follows
from Lemma 2 that the firm optimally chooses θ2 = θ. From (10), it is immediate that the firm
chooses θ1 as to maximize E(S2(θ1)|s). The following proposition characterizes the solution to
this problem.
Proposition 4 If the conditions in Lemma 3 are met, the firm chooses the lowest value of θ1
for which a successful employee is induced to search, eθL. Otherwise, the choice of θ1 does not
aﬀect the firm’s expected total profits.
Proof: In appendix. ¥
Proposition 4 shows how the firm can choose θ1 strategically to commit to a more eﬃcient
contract in period 2. In particular, the firm chooses the lowest possible value of θ1 that still
results in search in the second period in the event of first-period success. The intuition is that a
low value θ1 makes it harder to encourage a successful employee to search, because the current
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project is associated with high private benefits. The firm must therefore oﬀer a higher salary
ws2(θ1) to make the employee search. As discussed above, this decreases second-period profits
but increases both second-period surplus and total profits.
Taken together, Lemma 3 and Proposition 4 identify two distinct roles for employee authority
in the two periods. The firm has an incentive to increase the employee’s authority in the second
period to reduce her reluctance to search. However, like the restructuring discussed in Section
3, this may undermine the employee’s incentives to search in period 1. Foreseeing that the
employee will be granted maximal authority over the project choice in period 2, the firm already
increases the employee’s authority in period 1. By deliberately making it costly to induce search
activity following a success, the firm commits to a high-powered incentive scheme that increases
the employee’s first-period search eﬀorts and the firm’s total profits.
In our approach, we have considered restructuring and the dynamic delegation of authority to
be separate ways of overcoming inertia. An immediate implication of our analysis is that if the
delegation of authority can resolve the inertia problem, it is a better policy for the firm than
restructuring. The reason is that the delegation of authority serves as an additional reward for
success, thereby increasing the employee’s initial search eﬀorts and the firm’s total profits. In
spite of the positive eﬀects of delegation, firms face a commitment problem if they have both
policies available simultaneously. Indeed, firms would restructure in period 2 as soon as period
1 success resulted in a reluctance to search (i.e., a binding search constraint). The possibility of
restructuring would therefore remove the use of delegation because delegation is more costly for
the firm from a period 2 perspective. It is thus important that a commitment not to restructure
be in place before the benefits of delegation can be reaped.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop a simple principal-agent model to analyze the inertial tendencies that
result from success. An employee who discovered a successful project in the previous period is
reluctant to invest eﬀort in searching for a new project, because the old project may be successful
again. We argue that monetary incentives are not necessarily an eﬀective tool for inducing search
in this situation. The problem for the firm is that a bonus for good performance, intended to
encourage searching, also increases the employee’s payoﬀ from not searching. This problem
is particularly pronounced in an environment that is suﬃciently volatile to make searching
worthwhile but stable enough to exacerbate the agency problem.
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The firm’s reaction to a successful employee’s reluctance to search for a new project will be
either to increase the power of the incentive scheme or to abandon the search altogether. We
show that these two reactions have very diﬀerent implications for total profits. High-powered
incentives serve as an additional reward for success, which increases the employee’s initial search
eﬀorts and the firm’s total profits. However, if the search is abandoned due to the severity of
the agency problem, total profits are reduced.
We argue that restructuring in the form of reorganization, job rotation or short-term employment
forces the employees to search in the second period, but may create a time-consistency problem.
In particular, these policies may increase second-period profits, but still decrease total profits
because initial search eﬀorts are undermined. Firms may therefore have an incentive to commit
to not restructuring — e.g. by making hiring or investment decisions that increase the cost of
restructuring the firm. Another possibility is to delegate more authority over project choice
to the employee, which increases the attractiveness of searching. While it may limit inertial
tendencies, this policy also creates the problem of reduced initial search activity. However, this
problem can be alleviated by granting some authority to the employee already in the first period.
An interesting issue relates to the interpretation of the volatility parameter α as competitive
pressure. Building on the analysis of managerial incentives and product market competition
presented in Schmidt (1997), we conjecture that competition introduces an eﬀect that works
against inertial tendencies. Search eﬀorts are strategic substitutes if profits are the performance
measure used in the incentive contract because higher eﬀort in a competing firm reduces the
expected profit resulting from one’s own eﬀort. Therefore, if the employee of one firm stops
searching, the employees of the competitors will react by increasing the intensity of their search
eﬀorts. In terms of the current model, search inactivity triggers an increase in α, which makes it
harder to sustain inertia as an equilibrium outcome. We leave this and other issues as avenues
for future research.
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A Proof of Lemmata and Propositions
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
In the region considered the firm’s problem is the absence of searching (assumption A.3.). Thus
reducing authority in the second period is not a sensible policy to increase profits. As a result,
θ2 ≤ θ is not binding. Accordingly, the Lagrangian associated with the firm’s problem is:
L =θ2B − w2
γ
(w2+(1− θ2)B)+
λ1
2γ
³
(w2+(1− θ2)B)
2−(1− α)(w2+(1− θ1)B)
´
+λ2 (θ2 − θ) .
Thus, the optimality conditions and the complementary slack conditions are:
∂L/∂w2 = (2θ2 − 1)Bγ −
2w2
γ
+ λ1
µ
w2 + (1− θ2)B
γ
− (1− α)
¶
= 0, (A1)
∂L/∂θ2 = Bγ ((2w2 − (2θ2 − 1)B)− λ1(w2 + (1− θ2)B)) + λ2 = 0, (A2)
λ2(θ2 − θ) = 0, (A3)
λ1
µ
(w2 + (1− θ2)B)2
2γ
− (1− α)(w2 + (1− θ1)B)
¶
= 0. (A4)
i) Suppose first that λ1 = 0. Then, it follows from optimality conditions (A1) and (A2) that the
set of candidate solutions consists of pairs θ2 and w =
(2θ2−1)B
2 satisfying the search constraint.
Furthermore, it follows then from (A2) that λ2 = 0. Notice that the candidate solutions all give
rise to the same profits for the firm. Inserting w = (2θ2−1)B2 , the search constraint reduces to
B2
8γ
≥ (1− α)
µ
(2θ2 − 1)B
2
+ (1− θ1)B
¶
, (A5)
which is relaxed as much as possible for θ2 = θ. Hence, whenever the set of candidate solutions is
non-empty, the solution θ2 = θ and w =
(2θ−1)B
2 is a part of it. Plugging θ2 = θ and w =
(2θ−1)B
2
into (A5), we find that a candidate solution for which λ1 = 0 exists for B4γ(1−2(θ1−θ)) ≥ 1− α.
ii) Suppose instead that λ1 > 0. Then, the optimality conditions (A1) and (A2) can be rewritten
as:
−B(1− α)λ1 + λ2 = 0,
which implies that λ2 > 0. The complementary slack conditions (A3) and (A4) then imply that
θ2 = θ and that the wage is given by the solution to the search constraint for θ2 = θ. Because
the search constraint is assumed to be binding, this is a valid solution for B4γ(1−2(θ1−θ)) ≤ 1−α.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
From Lemma 2 we have that the expected profits if the firm induces searching are given by:
πS2 (θ1) =
( ¡
θB − wS2 (θ1)
¢ ¡
wS2 (θ1) + (1− θ)B
¢
1
γ if θ1 ≤
1
2 + θ −
B
8γ(1−α)
B2
4γ otherwise
.
The function πS2 (θ1) is increasing in θ1 for θ1 ≤ 12 + θ −
B
8γ(1−α) , because¡
θB − wS2 (θ1)
¢ ¡
wS2 (θ1) + (1− θ)B
¢
1
γ is decreasing in w
S
2 (θ1) for w
S
2 (θ1) >
(2θ−1)B
2 and w
S
2 (θ1)
is decreasing in θ1. Calculations show that πS2 (θ1) is concave in θ1 for θ1 ≤ 12 + θ −
B
8γ(1−α) .
Define '(θ1) := πS2 (θ1) − (1 − α)θ1B. Calculations show that '(θ1) is increasing (decreasing)
in θ1 for θ1 ≤ (>) bθ := θ + 2 − B2(1−α)γ − 3(1−α)γ2B where bθ < 12 + θ − B8γ(1−α) in the region of
(1− α) considered. Thus, '(θ1) exhibits a global maximum for θ1 = bθ. It can be verified that
'
³bθ´ > 0 for (1− α) < 1+θ−√θ(2+θ)B4γ . Under assumption A.3. there exists a non-empty
region of (1− α) for which '
³bθ´ > 0 iﬀ. 1+θ−√θ(2+θ)B4γ > (2−θ)B4γ ⇐⇒ θ < 23 .
Suppose that (1− α) <

1+θ−
√
θ(2+θ)

B
4γ and θ <
2
3 such that '
³bθ´ > 0. Assumption A.3
implies that it is not profitable to induce searching for θ1 = θ2 = θ. Hence, '(θ) < 0. Fur-
thermore, it can be verified that '
³
1
2 + θ −
B
8γ(1−α)
´
< 0 for the values of (1− α) considered.
It follows then from the concavity and continuity of '(θ1) that there exists a region (eθL,eθH)
around bθ for which '(θ1) > 0, (eθL,eθH) ⊂ hθ, 12 + θ − B8γ(1−α)i. Hence, the firm will encourage
a successful employee to search in the second period iﬀ. θ1 ∈ (eθL,eθH).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that the conditions in Lemma 3 are fulfilled. Then, there exist θ
0
and θ
00
such that
θ1 = θ
0
leads to searching in the second period in the case of success whereas θ1 = θ
00
does not.
Since the firm chooses to induce searching by oﬀering a positive monetary bonus for θ1 = θ
0
, we
have that πS2 (θ
0
) ≥ (1 − α)θ0B. Furthermore, because the employee chooses to search, it must
hold that US2 (θ
0
) ≥ (1− α)(w + (1− θ0)B) where US2 (θ
0
) ((1− α)(w + (1− θ0)B)) is the utility
from searching (not searching). Hence, given that w ≥ 0, we have that
E(S2(θ
0
)|s) = πS2 (θ
0
) + US2 (θ
0
) ≥ (1− α)B(θ0 + w + (1− θ0)) ≥ (1− α)B ⇔
E(S2(θ
0
)|s) ≥ (1− α)B = E(S2(θ00)|s).
It follows then from (10) that the firm chooses θ1 such that there is search in the second period
in the case of success. Furthermore, conditional on the employee searching and θ2 = θ, the social
27
surplus can be written as:
E(S2(θ1)|s) = ((1− θ)B + w
S
2 (θ1))B
γ
− ((1− θ)B + w
S
2 (θ1))
2
2γ
,
where wS2 (θ1) is the monetary bonus as a function of θ1. As ∂E(S2(θ1)|s)/∂w > 0 and
∂wS2 (θ1)/∂θ1 < 0, it follows again from (10) that the optimal choice of θ1 for the firm is the
minimal value of θ1 that induces searching in the second period, eθL.
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